4 edition of Dynamic contracting, persistent shocks and optimal taxation found in the catalog.
Dynamic contracting, persistent shocks and optimal taxation
by Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research Dept. in [Minneapolis, MN]
Written in English
|Series||Working paper / Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research Dept. ;, 640, Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis : Online) ;, 640.|
|Contributions||Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.|
|The Physical Object|
|LC Control Number||2005620104|
dynamic taxation in the presence of political economy and commitment constraints. In 1. Since in the literature following Mirrlees the optimal tax-transfer program is a solution to a mechanism design problem, we use the terms “optimal tax-transfer program”, “optimal non-linear taxation”, and “mechanism” interchangeably. 2. A Theory of Dynamic Contracting with Financial Constraints (R&R at JET) with Rohit Lamba Abstract: Financial constraints preclude many surplus producing economic transactions, and inhibit the growth of many others. This paper models financial constraints through the interaction of persistent private information and borrowing limitations for the agent.
The optimal income taxation problem has been extensively studied in one-period models. This paper analyzes optimal income taxation when consumers work for many periods. We also analyze what information, if any, that the government learns about abilities in one period can be used in later periods to attain more redistribution than in a one. slowly, whereas the 5-year signal is the most persistent. We calculate the optimal dynamic trading strategy taking transaction costs into account and compare its performance to the optimal portfolio ignoring transaction costs and to a class of strategies that .
Dynamic Contracting is a client and project driven construction company which prides itself, by always delivering more to its clients. We build successful construction projects guided by the best team of professionals trained on a solid foundation of experience, meticulous attention to detail, superb workmanship, and exceptional client care. A Dynamic Theory of Optimal Capital Structure and Executive Compensation Our theory is developed in an dynamic optimal contracting framework, and, as a result, our model yields predictions about the joint dynamics of a Þrm™s capital structure feature that emerges is the distinction between temporary and persistent production shocks.
Calendar of the plea rolls of the Exchequer of the Jews preserved in the Public Record Office
sketch of the Winters family.
Behaviour and perception in strange environments
Human Geography in Action
History of the New York Yankees
problem plays of Shakespeare
Gatherings in honor of Dorothy E. Miner.
Interpersonal communication in pharmacy
The education of the people
Stormover the everglades
economical cookery book
Genetics of populations
Dynamic Contracting, Persistent Shocks and Optimal Taxation∗ Yuzhe Zhang Working Paper Revised December ABSTRACT In this paper I develop continuous-time methods for solving dynamic principal-agent problems in which the agent’s privately observed productivity shocks are persistent over time.
I characterize. Dynamic contracting, persistent shocks and optimal taxation In this paper I develop continuous-time methods for solving dynamic principal-agent problems in which the agent?s privately observed productivity shocks are persistent over time.
In this paper I develop continuous-time methods for solving dynamic principal-agent problems in which the agent’s privately observed productivity shocks are persistent over time. I characterize the optimal contract as the solution to a system of ordinary differential equations, and show that, under this contract, the agent’s utility.
In this paper, Dynamic contracting develop continuous-time methods for solving dynamic contracting problems and apply them to an optimal taxation model in which the agent’s privately observed productivity shocks are persistent over time. Productivity process is modeled as a ﬁnite-state Markov chain with transitions arriving as a Poisson by: In this paper, we develop continuous-time methods for solving dynamic principal-agent problems in which the agent's privately observed productivity shocks are persistent over time.
We characterize the optimal contract as the solution to a system of ordinary differential equations and show that, under this contract, the agent's utility converges to its lower bound|immiserization occurs.
1 Introduction. This paper studies optimal taxation in a class of dynamic economies with private information. We consider an environment in which agents' preferences are defined over consumption and persistent shocks and optimal taxation book, and each agent receives a privately observed sequence of i.i.d.
preference shocks. Bergemann and Välimäki and Athey and Segal introduce dynamic generalizations of the classic Vickery-Clarke-Groves incentive compatible and efficient mechanism, Boleslavsky and Said study an infinite period dynamic interaction with persistent shocks and continuous types, while Pavan et al.
work on the general mechanism design problem with. This is in sharp contrast to the static case with Pareto tail of the skills distribution of Diamond () and Saez (), who show that the taxes on the high skill agents are increasing and tend to high levels (%) depending on the parameters of the tail ratio of skills.
productivity of ﬁrms in Compustat data from to to be Most dynamic ﬁnancial contracting models thus far have restricted themselves to iid models of cash ﬂow diversion. Speciﬁcally, we study a dynamic contracting model with persistent asymmetric information and cash (or limited liability) constraints.
Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information dynamic contracting literature has extensively studied the properties of constrained-eﬃcient allocations in His analysis allows for persistent idio-syncratic shocks.
Kocherlakota’s tax system is not recursive and does not. Optimal Taxation Policy iIJ Dynamic Stochastic Economies In the past decade there has been substantial interest in characterizing optimal tax policies in dynamic economies and constructing empirical tests of the optimality hypothe-sis.
Barro () argued that optimally chosen tax rates would display strong persistence, a. We study a dynamic agency model where the agent privately observes the firm's cash flows that are subject to persistent shocks. We characterize the policy dynamics and implement the optimal contract by financial securities.
Because bad performance distorts investors' beliefs downward, the agent has less incentive to misrepresent information. An endogenous number of consecutive "good shocks", say n(ht), is required for the optimal distor-tion to reach zero.
For every additional "bad shock", as distortions increase, this number increases: n(ht; H) n(ht). Once the optimal distortion reaches zero it stays at zero, that is, eﬃciency is an absorbing state. In this book, Narayana Kocherlakota surveys and discusses this exciting new approach to public finance.
An important book for advanced PhD courses in public finance and macroeconomics, The New Dynamic Public Finance provides a formal connection between the problem of dynamic optimal taxation and dynamic principal-agent contracting theory.
This connection means that the properties of solutions to principal-agent problems can be used to determine the properties of optimal tax systems. () use micro level data to evaluate predictions of dynamic optimal policy models.
Golosov and Tsyvinski () study a disability insurance model with fully persistent shocks. Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Werning () is a two-period numerical study of the determinants of dynamic optimal taxation in the spirit of Tuomala ().
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, This thesis examines three models of dynamic contracting. The first model is a model of dynamic moral hazard with partially persistent states, and the second model considers relational contracts when the states are partially persistent.
Most modern dynamic models of macroeconomics build on the framework described in Solow’s () paper.1 To motivate what is to follow, we start with a brief description of the Solow model. This model was set up to study a closed economy, and we will assume that there is a constant population.
The model The model consists of some simple. A Theory of Dynamic Contracting with Financial Constraints. SSRN Electronic Journal, CrossRef; as the result of shocks to their preferences or learning and experimentation, (b) the design of multi-period procurement auctions when firms’ costs evolve as the result of past investments, (c) the design of optimal tax codes when workers.
In response to these problems, the new dynamic public finance was developed to study the design of optimal taxes given only minimal restrictions on the set of possible tax instruments, and on the nature of shocks affecting people in the economy.
In this book, Narayana Kocherlakota surveys and discusses this exciting new approach to public finance. Marek Kapicka, "Efficient Allocations in Dynamic Private Information Economies with Persistent Shocks: A First-Order Approach," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol.
80(3), pages Townsend, Robert M, "Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago.
Advances in Dynamic Optimal Taxation By Narayana R. Kocherlakota 1 This paper surveys the recent literature concerning the structure of optimal taxes in dynamic economies in which agents are privately informed about skills and eﬀort. Keywords: optimal taxation, private information, dynamic .we study optimal dynamic contracting under moral hazard when contracts are implemented with this type of random monitoring technology.
Speci–cally, we consider an in–nitely repeated game in which in every period the agent chooses a payo⁄ relevant action (an e⁄ort level) and the principal.shock and a stochastic aggregate shock.
Thus, ﬁrms with low idiosyncratic shocks ﬁnd it prof-itable to operate only when the aggregate shock is high enough and the cost of capital low enough. The supply of capital declines after a bad aggregate shock, and with persistent shocks, one bad shock is likely to be followed by another.